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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Appellants own testimony does not show that the 
oral contract lacked consideration. Neither does 
it show that it was a trilateral contract to which 
the third party did not agree. 
Respondent contends in his Statement of Facts that "Florence 
alleges and testified in his deposition that he thereafter requested and 
obtained from Iverson an oral assurance that if Iverson knew of any 
other property that the commission arrangement would remain the same 
should Gaddis1 clients purchase other property" (P,3 - underscoring 
added). In support of that he cites R89 and appellants deposition 
Pp 14-15. There is no R 89. The allegation referred to is on R3 
in paragraph 8. It reads as follows: 
"At the time the aforesaid letter was 
delivered to the defendant DeWayne Iverson 
the plaintiff asked for and received an assur-
ance from that said defendant that there would 
be a three way s p l i t on any real estate com-
mission that was earned as a result of any sale 
effected as a result of the j o i n t efforts of 
Gaddis Investment and DeWayne Iverson". 
Certainly that allegation does not indicate that Florence's 
performance of bringing the buyer's broker and the sellers agent together 
preceeded the oral agreement, At best i t is s i lent as to such sequence. 
As for the other c i ta t ion the substance of the questioning of Florence 
by Iverson's counsel reads as follows; 
"Q. I f I understand what you said, that 
is what you said to Mr. Iverson af ter you had 
handed him the le t te r and he had given you the 
Karen Lee description. 
A. Yes, depending on before or af ter . That's 
the general conversation that was had that morning." 
I t seems clear from Florence's response to counsels leading 
question that he qual i f ied his affirmance by not accepting the se quence 
of events unless they conformed to his re col lect ion. Otherwise what 
does "depending" mean? 
So much for the unenforceability of the oral contract based 
on lack of consideration. 
As for the lack of consent of a necessary party, respondent's 
counsel here cites no authority for the proposition that A cannot make 
a contract with B that obligates B in his dealings with C to arrange 
for compensation for A for services A agrees to render which w i l l 
benefit both B and C. His only argument in support of his ipse d i x i t 
is the assertion that "the language of the alleged promise to Florence 
purports to set up a t r i - l a te ra l agreement, and the agreement of 
P.10 Gaddis, the third essential party was never obtained"/ What is the 
"language11 to which he refers? Where is i t found? In order for Gaddis 
to be obligated to share his commission obviously he would have to 
agree to do so but such agreement could be made by him with Iverson 
(who had to do i t for his own benefit in any event) for the benefit 
of both Florence and Iverson as well as for Iverson's benefit alone. 
At the very least this shows a genuine dispute as to a material fact, 
to wit; whether a t r i - la te ra l contract was contemplated by the 
parties to this appeal and thus summary disposition would be unwarranted. 
POINT II 
Appellants own testimony does not show he was not 
qualified to enforce the implied contract arising 
from an applicable trade and business practice. No 
law of the case bars recovery on that claim. 
Respondent contends that "work" on the particular sale is 
essential to claim a share under the implied contract based on an 
applicable trade and custom (it is to be noted that respondent has 
never contended in either his memorandum in support of his motion for 
summary judgment nor in his brief in this court that there is not such 
a trade custom) See P. 14. He contends that without such work 
there is no "participation". Nothing in the record indicates such 
equivalance,much less is it made conclusive. In fact the only comment 
made in that matter in the entire record is that of Florence on Page 
25 of his deposition when asked the following question by Iverson's 
Attorney; 
"Q. Did you perform any service by way of 
contract with either the buyer or the seller of the 
Brittany Apartments as distinguished from the Karen 
Lee Apartments? 
A. The only service that I rendered on the Karen 
Lee Apartments was to put these two brokers together". 
Certainly there could be no question that his services would 
have qualified for a share of the commission if the Karen Lee had been 
purchased rather than the Brittany Apartments and it was recognized by 
both of these parties on August 26th that the property to be purchased 
might well be one other than the Karen Lee when Florence said "Now, if 
this Karen Lee doesn't work and there is something else that you know 
of, let's get it out on the table " (Dep. 15) -(underscoring 
added.) Can it be said as a matter of law that the custom and trade 
practice in questio nrequires more than bringing of the selling and 
buying brokers or agents together? 
As for the law of the case, respondent cites no authorities 
for the proposition that an adverse ruling on one claim (express oral 
contract) bars recovery on a different claim against a different de-
fendant if the order concluding the case against such other party en-
compasses the same type claim now being asserted against the remaining 
defendant. Would the result be the same or different if the dismissal 
had been initiated by the party palintiff? Must the law require a 
claimant to treat each party claimed against in the same manner just 
because the nature of the claims are identical? To state the proposition 
seems to refute it. In any event such must not have support in case 
law or respondent would certainly have cited it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition 
that there was a bilateral oral contract to which respondent agreed, 
to wit: that the sale's commission should be divided three ways and 
his performance by bringing the selling agent and buyer's broker to-
gether was full performance of that contract regardless of what 
property was sold. The agreement was entered into before there was 
performance by the Appellant. 
Point II. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposi-
tion that his participation in bringing the contracting parties to-
gether met performance of the admitted custom and practice in real 
estate to share commissions when two or more brokers are involved. 
No law of the case precluded appellant from proceeding on his implied 
contract claim because he did not appeal the dismissal of the oral 
contract claim against Gaddis as he never claimed Gaddis was a party 
to that contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's testimony cited in his deposition does not 
establish as a matter of law that he has no claim as such testimony 
is consistent with the pleading in his complaint wherein he bases 
his claim on a bilateral oral contract made with respondent which 
required the payment to him of a share of the commission for the 
services rendered in bringing the selling agent together with buyers 
broker and that said services were to be so paid for whether the pur-
chase was made of the Karen Lee property or any other property. 
Nothing in his complaint or testimony indicates that a trilateral 
contract was contemplated. 
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not 
establish as a matter of law that appellant did not participate to 
such an extent that the implied contract based on an applicable trade 
practice would not entitle him to compensation. No law of the case 
bars recovery on the implied in law contract claim. 
Respectfully submitted this lO^ day of January, 1985. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Appellants own testimony does not show that the 
oral contract lacked consideration. Neither does 
it show that it was a trilateral contract to which 
the third party did not agree. 
Respondent contends in his Statement of Facts that "Florence 
alleges and testified in his deposition that he thereafter requested and 
obtained from Iverson an oral assurance that if Iverson knew of any 
other property that the commission arrangement would remain the same 
should Gaddis1 clients purchase other property" (P,3 - underscoring 
added). In support of that he cites R89 and appellants deposition 
Pp 14-15. There is no R 89. The allegation referred to is on R3 
in paragraph 8. It reads as follows: 
"At the time the aforesaid letter was 
delivered to the defendant DeWayne Iverson 
the plaintiff asked for and received an assur-
ance from that said defendant that there would 
be a three way s p l i t on any real estate com-
mission that was earned as a result of any sale 
effected as a result of the j o i n t efforts of 
Gaddis Investment and DeWayne Iverson". 
Certainly that allegation does not indicate that Florence's 
performance of bringing the buyer's broker and the sellers agent together 
preceeded the oral agreement, At best i t is s i lent as to such sequence. 
As for the other c i tat ion the substance of the questioning of Florence 
by Iverson's counsel reads as follows: 
"Q. I f I understand what you said, that 
is what you said to Mr. Iverson af ter you had 
handed him the le t te r and he had given you the 
Karen Lee description. 
A. Yes, depending on before or af ter . That's 
the general conversation that was had that morning." 
I t seems clear from Florence's response to counsels leading 
question that he qual i f ied his affirmance by not accepting the se quence 
of events unless they conformed to his re col lect ion. Otherwise what 
does "depending" mean? 
So much for the unenforceability of the oral contract based 
on lack of consideration. 
As for the lack of consent of a necessary party, respondent's 
counsel here cites no authority for the proposition that A cannot make 
a contract with B that obligates B in his dealings with C to arrange 
for compensation for A for services A agrees to render which w i l l 
benefit both B and C. His only argument in support of his ipse d i x i t 
is the assertion that "the language of the alleged promise to Florence 
purports to set up a tri-lateral agreement, and the agreement of 
P.10 
Gaddis, the third essential party was never obtained'1/ What is the 
"language" to which he refers? Where is it found? In order for Gaddis 
to be obligated to share his commission obviously he would have to 
agree to do so but such agreement could be made by him with Iverson 
(who had to do it for his own benefit in any event) for the benefit 
of both Florence and Iverson as well as for Iverson's benefit alone. 
At the very least this shows a genuine dispute as to a material fact, 
to wit: whether a tri-lateral contract was contemplated by the 
parties to this appeal and thus summary disposition would be unwarranted. 
POINT II 
Appellants own testimony does not show he was not 
qualified to enforce the implied contract arising 
from an applicable trade and business practice. No 
law of the case bars recovery on that claim. 
Respondent contends that "work" on the particular sale is 
essential to claim a share under the implied contract based on an 
applicable trade and custom (it is to be noted that respondent has 
never contended in either his memorandum in support of his motion for 
summary judgment nor in his brief in this court that there is not such 
a trade custom) See P. 14. He contends that without such work 
there is no "participation". Nothing in the record indicates such 
equivalance,much less is it made conclusive. In fact the only comment 
made in that matter in the entire record is that of Florence on Page 
25 of his deposition when asked the following question by Iverson's 
Attorney; 
"Q. Did you perform any service by way of 
contract with either the buyer or the seller of the 
Brittany Apartments as distinguished from the Karen 
Lee Apartments? 
A. The only service that I rendered on the Karen 
Lee Apartments was to put these two brokers together". 
Certainly there could be no question that his services would 
have qualified for a share of the commission if the Karen Lee had been 
purchased rather than the Brittany Apartments and it was recognized by 
both of these parties on August 26th that the property to be purchased 
might well be one other than the Karen Lee when Florence said "Now, if 
this Karen Lee doesn't work and there is something else that you know 
of, let's get it out on the table " (Dep. 15) -(underscoring 
added.) Can it be said as a matter of law that the custom and trade 
practice in questio nrequires more than bringing of the selling and 
buying brokers or agents together? 
As for the law of the case, respondent cites no authorities 
for the proposition that an adverse ruling on one claim (express oral 
contract) bars recovery on a different claim against a different de-
fendant if the order concluding the case against such other party en-
compasses the same type claim now being asserted against the remaining 
defendant. Would the result be the same or different if the dismissal 
had been initiated by the party palintiff? Must the law require a 
claimant to treat each party claimed against in the same manner just 
because the nature of the claims are identical? To state the proposition 
seems to refute it. In any event such must not have support in case 
law or respondent would certainly have cited it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition 
that there was a bilateral oral contract to which respondent agreed, 
to wit: that the sale's commission should be divided three ways and 
his performance by bringing the selling agent and buyer's broker to-
gether was full performance of that contract regardless of what 
property was sold. The agreement was entered into before there was 
performance by the Appellant. 
Point II. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposi-
tion that his participation in bringing the contracting parties to-
gether met performance of the admitted custom and practice in real 
estate to share commissions when two or more brokers are involved. 
No law of the case precluded appellant from proceeding on his implied 
contract claim because he did not appeal the dismissal of the oral 
contract claim against Gaddis as he never claimed Gaddis was a party 
to that contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not 
establish as a matter of law that he has no claim as such testimony 
is consistent with the pleading in his complaint wherein he bases 
his claim on a bilateral oral contract made with respondent which 
required the payment to him of a share of the commission for the 
services rendered in bringing the selling agent together with buyers 
broker and that said services were to be so paid for whether the pur-
chase was made of the Karen Lee property or any other property. 
Nothing in his complaint or testimony indicates that a trilateral 
contract was contemplated. 
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not 
establish as a matter of law that appellant did not participate to 
such an extent that the implied contract based on an applicable trade 
practice would not entitle him to compensation. No law of the case 
bars recovery on the implied in law contract claim. 
Respectfully submitted this JO^ day of January, 1985. 
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ROBERT B. HANSEN 
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